This 28th day of May 2010, it appears to the Court that:... (1) The plaintiffs-appellants, Saul A. Fox, Mercury Assets, LLC, and Mercury Trust, on behalf of themselves and derivatively on behalf of Fox Paine & Company, LLC (collectively, "Fox"), have petitioned this Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 42, to appeal from the Court of Chancery's interlocutory rulings on April 5, 2010 and April 9, 2010, which enjoined Fox and related entities from pursuing arbitrations filed in New......  

This 28th day of May 2010, it appears to the Court that:... (1) The petitioners, Saul A. Fox, Mercury Assets, LLC, and Mercury Trust, on behalf of themselves and derivatively on behalf of Fox Paine & Company, LLC (collectively, "Fox"), seek to invoke this Court's original jurisdiction a) to issue an extraordinary writ of mandamus1 to the Court of Chancery directing it to vacate its April 5 and April 9, 2010 orders in C.A. No. 3187 preliminarily enjoining the prosecution of several...  

This 28th day of May, 2010, the Court, having considered the decision of the Court of Chancery dated July 24, 2009, and the oral arguments and briefs of the parties, has determined that: to the extent the issues raised on appeal are factual, the... ... ... record evidence supports the trial judge's factual findings; and to the extent that the issues raised on appeal are legal, they are controlled by settled Delaware law, which was properly applied... NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the...  

M3 Healthcare Solutions sought modification, vacation, or correction of an arbitration award, in its answer to Family Practice Associates, P.A.'s complaint to confirm that award. The Vice Chancellor held that M3's answer did not constitute a statutorily required application to contest an award and, in any case, M3 failed to assert sufficient grounds to alter the award. Although the Vice Chancellor incorrectly decided that M3 improperly applied for modification, vacation or correction, given...  

This 27th day of May 2010, it appears to the Court that on March 11, 2010, the Clerk issued a notice to show cause to the appellant in this appeal from the Superior Court's November 12, 2009 denial of the appellant's motion for credit for time served. The notice directed that the appellant show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot in view of the Superior Court's March 1, 2010 order on remand that granted the appellant ninety-five days of credit for time served. Because the...  

This 27th day of May 2010, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the appellee's motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:... (1) The defendant-appellant, Walter L. Smith, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's February 16, 2010 order denying his third motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court's... ... ......  

This 27th day of May 2010, it appears to the Court that:... (1) The defendant-appellant, Maryland Casualty Company, has petitioned this Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 42, to accept an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court dated April 9, 2010. The trial court's order denied defendant's motion for summary judgment... (2) Defendant filed its application for certification to take an interlocutory appeal in the Superior Court on April 23, 2010. The Superior Court denied the...  

This 27th day of May 2010, it appears to the Court that on May 10, 2010, the Clerk issued a notice directing that the appellant show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for the Court's lack of jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal in a criminal case. Because the appellant has not responded to the notice to show cause, he is deemed to have consented to the dismissal of the appeal... NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 3(b)(2) and 29(b), that the...  

Dear Mr. King,... Pending before me is your first motion for postconviction relief, filed pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 ("Rule 61"). For the reasons explained below, your motion is summarily dismissed.1... On November 24, 2009, you entered a guilty plea to one count of Robbery First Degree, one count of Assault Second Degree, one count of Conspiracy Second Degree and one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. After conducting a plea colloquy, I found...  

Dear Counsel:... This is the Court's decision on a Petition filed pursuant to the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to review a decision of the Sussex County Board of Adjustment ("Board").1 The Petition was filed by H.P. Layton Partnership, Patricia Thompson and Linda Madrid ("Petitioners"). The Respondents are G. Anthony Keen and Jacqueline R. Keen and Flexera, Inc., ("Respondents" or "Applicants"), as well as the Board itself. The Board granted the Respondents'...  

Dear Counsel:... This case arises from an alleged breach of a commercial lease for failure to pay rent. Plaintiff has moved to dismiss Defendants' counterclaims which allege that Plaintiff (1) failed to mitigate its damages and (2) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). For the... ... ... reasons stated below, the Court will treat Defendants' mitigation claim as a defense and will dismiss their FDCPA claim... Facts... Plaintiff Route 40 Holdings, Inc. entered into a...  

Dear Counsel:... The Court is in receipt of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence filed on May 14, 2010, which reads in its entirety:... MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE... COMES NOW the defendant, above, by and through counsel, Joe Hurley, who moves to suppress all evidence found as a result of the... ... ... defendant's vehicle, and in support of such application, maintains that the defendant did not give consent to search his vehicle and, therefore, the putative consent cannot form the basis of...  

This is the Court's decision on a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Charles W. Wiggins ("Wiggins"). In the instant action, filed under the Delaware Child Victim's Act of 2007,1 Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Doe") alleges personal injuries arising from repeated acts of sexual abuse by Wiggins, a Roman Catholic priest, during Doe's time as a student at St. Mark's School... By this motion, Wiggins seeks dismissal based upon Doe's failure to comply with Superior Court Civil Rule 4(j),...  

Dear Counsel:... The Court has considered defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and plaintiffs' opposition thereto... By way of background, on November 21, 2008, Pauline Barrios, wife of decedent Kenneth Barrios, filed this lawsuit, alleging that Kenneth Barrios' acute myelogenous leukemia was caused by exposure to benzene-containing substances he was exposed to while working for defendant E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., Inc. ("DuPont"). The complaint filed by Mrs. Barrios...  

The defendant-appellant, Shawn Smith ("Smith"), appeals from his judgments of conviction in the Superior Court for Aggravated Menacing, Assault in the Second Degree, weapon and related offenses. Smith contends that the record does not establish that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to counsel before being permitted to proceed pro se at trial. We agree. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be reversed... Facts... During the first...  

Leslie Ramsey ("Ramsey"), the defendant below, appeals from a Superior Court final judgment of conviction of Attempted First Degree Robbery. On appeal, Ramsey claims that the Superior Court erred by finding him guilty of Attempted First Degree Robbery as a lesser-included offense of First Degree Robbery, even though neither Ramsey nor the State requested adjudication on that lesser-included offense. We hold that the "party autonomy" rule, which places the burden on the parties...  

This 25th day of May 2010, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief, the appellee's motion to affirm and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:... (1) The appellant, Leonardo B. Street, filed this appeal from the Superior Court's July 17, 2009 denial of his motion for postconviction relief. The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Street's opening brief that the appeal is...  

This 25th day of May 2010, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief, the appellee's motion to affirm and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:... (1) The appellant, Thomas J. Gordon, filed this appeal from the Superior Court's denial of his motion for modification of sentence and motion for correction of an illegal sentence. The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment.1... (2) On April 5, 2007, Gordon pled guilty to Assault in...  

This 24th day of May 2010, it appears to the Court that:... (1) On April 22, 2010, the Court received appellant's notice of appeal from a Superior Court order, dated January 14, 2010, which denied appellant's pro se motion for modification of sentence. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 6, a timely notice of appeal should have been filed on or before February 15, 2010... (2) The Clerk issued a notice pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29(b) directing appellant to show cause why the appeal should not...  

This 24th day of May, 2010, upon consideration of the appeal of Shanaye Brown ("Brown") from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("the Board"), it appears to the Court that:... 1. The sole issue in this appeal concerns whether the Board properly refused review and affirmed a claims deputy's determination of disqualification based upon Brown's failure to timely appeal. After being separated from her employment with The Wood Company, Brown filed a claim for...